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Debit and credit cards have gradually increased in importance as instruments for retail 
payments. This has prompted anti-trust authorities at both national and European levels to 
investigate and limit the interchange fee-based revenue model of four-party schemes. These 
moves were followed in 2015 by the introduction of the Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR), 
which introduced price rules to nurture a competitive, innovative and secure payments 
environment for all stakeholders. The IFR caps the interchange fees on consumer debit and 
credit cards and prohibits restrictions on co-badging and certain requirements to honour all 
cards for merchants. 
 
This paper assesses the impact of the IFR. Based on a literature review and data analysis, it 
concludes that the IFR has led to a drop in interchange fees – in some cases below the 
maximum defined in the legislation in all EU member states.  
The decrease in the interchange fee is largely reflected in lower charges for merchants, 
although the reduction is – at least partially – offset by higher scheme fees charged by 
international four-party card schemes and by higher fees for cardholders. 
The policy recommendations aim to increase transparency for a fuller understanding of the 
functioning of the market and to enhance competitiveness in both the market for card 
payments and other payment instruments. 
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1. Introduction 
Cashless payments are gradually becoming the most common means of payment. But there 
are wide variations in the relative importance of cashless payments, e.g. card, direct debit, and 
other forms of retail payments such as e-money, vouchers, etc., across countries. In short, a 
bigger share of payments are cashless in those countries where the costs of such payments are 
lower and e-commerce is more developed. The so-called four-party debit and credit card 
transactions account for the largest share among cashless payments. 
In the context of card payments, there are two existing models: four-party and three-party 
schemes, with the first being the most commonly used. Four-party schemes involve the 
participation of four parties: the consumer (the ‘cardholder’) and his/her bank (the ‘issuer’) as 
well as the merchant and his/her respective bank (the ‘acquirer’). The four-party schemes are 
organised by card schemes, which could be considered as a fifth involved party. With 
Mastercard (Maestro, Mastercard, etc.) and Visa (V Pay)  there are two international four-party 
card schemes and 17 national four-party card schemes (Bancontact, Girocard, etc.) active in 
the EU.1 Three-party schemes consist of only three parties where the card scheme combines 
the role of issuer and acquirer. Examples of these schemes are American Express, Diners Club 
and Discovery Card. 
The regulatory scrutiny for the four-party card schemes has increased as card payments have 
become more widespread. Initially, most of the regulatory scrutiny was in the form of 
competition cases brought against the four-party card schemes at both the national and 
international level targeting their interchange fees.2 This was followed by formal legislation to 
reduce the interchange fees. The EU Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR)3 adopted in 2015 led to 
the largest ever reduction in interchange fees.4 The IFR capped the multilateral interchange 
fees for international four-party card schemes at 0.20% for debit card payments and 0.30% for 
credit card payments, with the possibility for member states to set lower caps for domestic 
card transactions. The cap is only applicable to consumer cards inside the European Economic 
Area (EEA). This means that payments using commercial cards and interregional card 
transactions are exempted. The cap was complemented with measures to enhance 
competition such as no restrictions on co-badging and no requirement to honour all cards for 
 
1 ECB (2019), “Card payments in Europe: Current landscape and future prospects: a Eurosystem perspective”. 
2  European Competition Network (2012) “Information Paper on Competition Enforcement in the Payments 
Sector”,:https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/information_paper_payments_en.pdf. 
3 123/13 of 19.5.2015 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015R0751). 
4 Veljan, A. (2018), “A critical review of the European Commission’s Multilateral Interchange Fee Regulation”, 
Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 232–244. 
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merchants, except for IFR price-regulated cards. Australia, 5  Spain 6  and the USA 7  had 
introduced similar laws before the IFR was introduced. 
This paper provides a brief assessment of the impact of the EU interchange fee cap based on a 
literature review and analysis of publicly available data. The analysis covers both the intended 
and unintended consequences of the EU’s price rules in the area of retail payments. 
As regards the intended consequences of the IFR,8 the main objective was to improve the 
functioning of the internal market by creating an integrated market for electronic payments, 
with no distinction between national and cross-border payments. In order to enjoy the full 
benefits of an internal market, it should facilitate secure, efficient, competitive and innovative 
payments.  
The European legislator had four main ideas in mind when proposing the IFR: 
First, the variety and level of interchange fees were effectively an entry barrier for new card 
schemes,  limiting the potential benefits of scale and scope benefits and innovation. Indeed, 
for a cross-border card scheme to be accepted by the issuers, the new card scheme needed to 
offer the highest interchange fee on the market.  
Second, the payments sector is traditionally defined along national borders; even today 17 EU 
member states have their own national card scheme. It is very difficult for these national 
solutions to operate cross-border, while the existence of national card schemes prevented new 
international card schemes from entering the market. In the run-up to the IFR several EU 
member states adopted various measures regarding card payments. National measures 
aggravated the existing barriers to cross-border card payments. 
Third, the choice of payment instrument should be left to consumers and merchants, to allow 
for effective competition between brands and payment instruments. The scheme rules 
(blending, transparency, restrictions on refusal of low-amount payments, the number of 
terminals in shops, etc.) and lack of information, prevented consumers and especially 
merchants from choosing or steering consumers towards the most cost-efficient means of 
payment. 
 
5 Stillman, R., Bishop, W., Malcolm, K. and Hildebrandt, N. (2008), “Regulatory intervention in the payment card 
industry by the Reserve Bank of Australia — Analysis of the evidence”,: https://www.rba.gov.au/paymentsand-
infrastructure/payments-system-regulation/past-regulatory-reviews/review-of-card-paymentsystems-
reforms/pdf/review-0708-pre-conclusions/ cra-28042008-2.pdf. 
6  Iranzo, J., Fernández, P., Gustavo, M. and Delgado, M. (2012), “The effects of the mandatory decrease of 
interchange fees in Spain”, MPRA Paper 43097, University Library of Munich: https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/43097/1/MPRA_ paper_43097.pdf. 
7 Wang, Z. (2012), “Debit card interchange fee regulation: some assessments and considerations”, Economic 
Quarterly, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 159–183. 
8 123/13 of 19.5.2015 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015R0751). 
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Fourth, in order to conform to the principle of technological neutrality as defined in the Digital 
Agenda for Europe, there should no distinction in the rules regarding location (offline, online, 
or mobile). 
Overall, the EU legislator made clear that the IFR is aimed at contributing to a secure, 
competitive and innovative payments environment for stakeholders and consumers. 
The remainder of this paper provides an overview of the four-party card schemes and related 
fees, in part 2. The assessment of the impact of the interchange fee cap is divided into three 
parts. Part 3 analyses of the impact of the cap on the interchange fee. Part 4 gives an analysis 
of the impact of the cap on the merchant service charges. Part 5 presents preliminary findings 
on the impact of the cap on cardholder fees. Part 6 draws the main policy conclusions and 
offers policy remarks. 
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2. Four-party card schemes 
Most card payments in Europe are conducted through so-called four-party schemes. These 
schemes involve five important actors:  
• Cardholder is a natural person that holds a debit or credit card with an issuer’s card 
scheme. 
• Merchant offers the cardholder the possibility to pay by card either through a point-of-
sale terminal or an online/mobile interface. The merchant has a payment account with 
the acquirer.  
• Issuer issues the card to the cardholder and issues and processes the transfer of money 
from the cardholder’s payment account to the acquirer. 
• Acquirer is responsible for accepting and processing the transfer of money to the 
merchant. 
• Card scheme organises the four-party card scheme, including setting the scheme rules, 
practices, and standards, etc. The rules and practices are enforced by the issuer and 
acquirer, which are members or subscribers of the card scheme. 
Figure 1. The four-party card scheme 
 
Source: Authors’ formulation based on European Commission (2016).9  
 
 
9  European Commission (2016), “Antitrust: Regulation on Interchange Fees”, MEMO/16/2162: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_16_2162. 
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For each payment of a cardholder for a good or service to a merchant, the issuer transfers 
money to the acquirer, who in turn transfers it to the merchant.  
The card payment market is a two-sided market, which means that the card scheme must bring 
the consumer and merchant together for the payment transaction. In general, the consumer is 
likely to be more sensitive to changes in the price of payment transactions than the merchant. 
The consumer can choose from among various payment instruments when purchasing the 
good or service. Even when the consumer considers the card payment to be safer and more 
convenient, s/he is still unlikely to want to pay a surcharge for using the card because most 
alternatives, such as cash, carry no charge. The merchant, however, is more likely to accept a 
higher cost for card payments from large schemes, as without accepting such card payments 
and their related costs the merchant risks losing the sales transaction. This difference in price-
sensitivity is also reflected in the allocation of the ‘costs’ of the transaction, which are skewed 
towards the merchant.10 In practice, therefore, fees for card payments follow the opposite 
direction to the money flow.  
The merchant pays the lion’s share of the transaction costs in the form of a merchant service 
charge (MSC) to the acquirer. There are various models for the MSC; some charge a fixed fee 
per transaction, a percentage fee per transaction or fixed monthly fees for access to payment 
gateways. 11  Additionally, the merchant can be charged terminal fees (e.g. fees for rental, 
maintenance)12 as well as activation and installation fees.13 
The acquirer pays an interchange fee to the issuer. This interchange fee is usually a substantial 
part of the MSC. The interchange fee is set by the card scheme or can be agreed bilaterally 
between the issuer and acquirer. Most schemes have defined the interchange fee as a share of 
the transaction value. However, there are also national card schemes such as the Belgian 
Bancontact scheme that apply a fixed fee.14  
In some cases, the cardholder receives a low financial compensation or loyalty rewards such as 
Air Miles from the issuer when spending on the card. However, in practice, most cardholders 
do pay their share to the issuer via their annual fees for the debit or credit card. This cost for 
card transactions can be included in the costs of a payment account package. In general, the 
cardholder does not need to pay a fee per transaction, with the exception of transactions in 
foreign currencies outside the EU for which cardholders may be charged transaction and 
 
10 Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2003), “An economic analysis of the determination of interchange fees in payment 
card systems”, Review of Network Economics 2(2): 69–79.  
11 These fees are related to the use of an interface that connects a card processing service to a merchant’s terminal 
or POS system. 
12 The rental charge of merchants for the chip and PIN machine. 
13 ECB (2014), “Card payments in Europe, a renewed focus on SEPA for cards”:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/cardpaymineu_renfoconsepaforcards201404en.pdf.  
14 Jonker, Nicole (2016), “Regulating Interchange Fees for Card Payments”, in Transforming Payment Systems in 
Europe, pp. 149-181. 
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currency exchange fees. In some countries, cardholders are charged for all transactions, 
account statements and billing information.15 
The card schemes charge scheme fees to both the issuer and the acquirer for participation in 
the scheme. Additionally, the processing entities (traditionally part of the card scheme) will also 
charge for clearing and settling the transactions between issuer and acquirer. 
In the past, some merchants charged consumers extra for the use of cards, especially for 
transactions of low value. However, following the introduction of the Payments Services 
Directive (PSD2) in 2018, merchants are no longer allowed to apply these so-called surcharges 
on card payments for which the interchange fee is regulated. 
For three-party schemes, the rules are slightly different given that in this case the schemes 
combine the role of card scheme, issuer and acquirer. These three-party card schemes 
therefore do not have an interchange fee and are exempted from the IFR in some respects. 
However, they are subject to the IFR for those elements of the scheme that are similar to four-
party schemes e.g. when they work with licensees for the issuing and/or acquiring of card-
based payment instruments. This concerned about 9% of the American Express cards issued in 
the EU and all Diners Club cards before the introduction of the IFR.16  
In the following, we assess the various impacts of the IFR on the main relations within the four-
party schemes. First, the impact on the relation between the issuer and acquirer. Second, the 
relation between the acquirer and the merchant. Third, the relation between the issuer and 
the cardholder. 
  
 
15  ECB (2014), “Card Payments in Europe – A Renewed Focus on SEPA for Cards”: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/cardpaymineu_renfoconsepaforcards201404en.pdf.  
16 European Commission (2013), “Payment Services Directive and Interchange fees Regulation: frequently asked 
questions”, MEMO/13/719: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-719_en.htm?locale=en.  
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Box 1. Overview of main antitrust cases on European interchange fees 
The revenue model of four-party card schemes has been under the scrutiny of the competition 
authorities at both national and EU level. There are several landmarked cases in the EU that have 
informed the IFR. 
MasterCard I (2007-09) 
The European Commission decision of 19 December 200717 prohibited Multilateral Interchange 
Fees (MIFs) for cross-border payments made with MasterCard and Maestro cards within the EEA. 
The Commission argued that the MIFs limit competition for merchants. The collectively agreed MIFs 
function as a minimum tariff for merchants. The Commission did not agree with MasterCard that 
the MIFs were efficient in encouraging both issuing banks to promote card payments with 
consumers and to motivate merchants to accept them. Instead, the Commission and later the EU 
General Court ruled in the first appeal in May 2012 that the MIFs are not strictly necessary in four-
party schemes as they could also operate the card scheme profitably through non-MIFs fees (card 
issuance, annual fees, interests, etc.). To comply with the European Commission decision, in 2009 
MasterCard reduced the cross-border consumer MIFs to 0.2% (for debit cards) and 0.3% (for credit 
cards). They did, however, increase the scheme fees.18  
Mastercard II (2015-19) 
In early 2019, the European Commission fined Mastercard €571 million for obstructing merchants’ 
access to cross-border card payment services. More specifically, the scheme rules obliged acquiring 
banks to apply the MIF of the country where the retailer was located. This was important as prior 
to the IFR there were large domestic differences in MIFs, from which merchants could not benefit 
due to the scheme rules. The fine followed a formal antitrust investigation initiated in April 2013,19 
with a Statement of Objections issued in July 2015. In the latter the Commission also raised 
objections about the higher interchange fees on payments inside the EEA with cards issued outside 
the EEA, in combination with the obligation for merchants to accept all cards in the card scheme.20 
Antitrust investigation against Visa Europe, Visa Inc. and Visa International Services Association 
(2000-19)  
After initial objections to certain Visa MIFs in 2000, the European Commission decided in July 2002 
that the Visa cross-border consumer MIFs within the EEA fulfilled the conditions for exemption. 
 
17 European Commission (2007), Commission decision related to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/34579/34579_1889_2.pdf. 
18  ECB (2014), Card payments in Europe, a renewed focus on SEPA for cards, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/cardpaymineu_renfoconsepaforcards201404en.pdf. 
19 European Commission (2019), “Antitrust: Commission fines Mastercard €570 million for obstructing merchants' 
access to cross-border card payment services”: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_582 
20  ECB (2014), “Card payments in Europe, a renewed focus on SEPA for cards”, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/cardpaymineu_renfoconsepaforcards201404en.pdf.  
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Following expiry of this exemption, and in line with the MasterCard decision of 2007, the 
Commission opened an antitrust investigation into the various Visa companies.  
The Statement of Objections issued in April 2009 covered all the consumer MIFs directly set by Visa 
Europe, including both domestic and cross-border transactions in the EEA. It also raised concerns 
about the MIFs on cross-border transactions involving non-EEA issued cards.  
In response, Visa Europe committed to reducing the maximum weighted average MIF for consumer 
debit cards for cross-border transactions and national transactions to 0.20%. Moreover, Visa 
gradually reduced their MIFs for deferred debit and credit card transactions from 1.1% to 0.7% in 
2007, with a 0.28% flat-rate MIF applied to debit card transactions. The commitments were made 
binding on Visa Europe in December 2010 for a period of four years. Moreover, the MIF was capped 
at 0.2% for certain debit card payments within the EEA, and Visa members were allowed to reveal 
certain information about the MIF to merchants.21 In 2019, both Visa and Mastercard committed 
to reducing their MIFs for payments with cards issued outside the EEA in the EEA.22 
  
 
21 ECB (2014), ibid.  
22European Commission (2019), “Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Mastercard 
and Visa to cut inter-regional interchange fees”: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2311 
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3. Impact of IFR on interchange fees 
The main feature of IFR was the introduction of a cap on interchange fees as of December 2015. 
In particular, the interchange fee caps on debit card transitions were set at 0.20% of the 
transaction value and at 0.30% on credit card transactions. 23 The cap applies to both the 
national and international four-party card schemes. The direct expected impact of the IFR 
would be a reduction of the interchange fee below the maximum level.  
The expectation of the European Commission before the introduction of the IFR was that it 
would lead to a reduction in the revenues of issuers, for which they might be partially 
compensated by an increase in transactions. This assumes that the reduction of interchange 
fees is passed on to the merchants in the form of lower MSCs, encouraging merchants to steer 
customers towards card payments.24 
Looking at the evolution of interchange fees, we observe that the average fee in the year 
preceding the introduction of the cap ranged from between 0.19% in the Netherlands and 
1.50% in Cyprus. Similarly, the interchange fees for payments with credit cards ranged from 
between 0.30% in Hungary and 1.64% in Germany. The differences are largely due to national 
circumstances (national card schemes, regulations, historical agreements, etc.). 
Figure 2. Debit card interchange fees pre- and post-introduction of the IFR 
  
Notes: The figure above shows the debit card interchange fees across EU member states before the introduction of the IFR 
(2014 or closest publicly available) in 2015 and after the introduction (2016 or closest publicly available). When the interchange 
fees are defined in absolute terms, they have been translated into percentages based on the average transaction values. The 
average amounts are based on the simple average of the Mastercard, Visa and national card schemes (if applicable and 
available). The countries with national card schemes are shown in dark blue. 
Source: Author’s computations based on data published by the ECB, European Commission, NBP, Visa, Mastercard and national 
card schemes.  
 
23 European Commission (2015), “Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions”, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32015R0751. 
24  European Commission (2015), “Survey on merchants’ costs of processing cash and card payments”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/dgcomp_final_report_en.pdf 
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Following the introduction of the IFR, the interchange fees in all EU member states decreased, 
except for Hungary where the interchange fees remained at the same level. The drop ranged 
from between 0% in Hungary to 87% in Cyprus. This means in practice that most member states 
have interchange fees at the maximum level allowed under the IFR. However, there are at least 
seven EU countries with lower than average interchange fees (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, 
Italy, Malta, the Netherlands and Spain). Interchange fees are mostly set below the maximum, 
especially in member states with national card schemes. Not all national card schemes’ 
interchange fees are publicly available, which might mean that there are more member states 
that charge lower or higher interchange fees. 
In practice, the drop-in revenues due to lower interchange fees were at least partially 
compensated by an increase in transactions. Part of the increase might have been due to the 
IFR, although the evidence is not convincing. The growth in the number and value of debit and 
credit cards at EU level following the entry into force of the IFR is not noticeably higher than in 
the years preceding the introduction and there is only a low correlation between the drop in 
average interchange fees and the increase in card transactions. 
Figure 3. Debit card transactions per capita pre- and post IFR entry into force 
 
Source: Author’s formulation based on data published by the ECB, European Commission, NBP, Visa, Mastercard and national 
card schemes.  
Looking at the absolute number of card transactions, there seems to be a negative relation 
between debit card payments and the interchange fee (see Figure 3). Indeed, the higher the 
average interchange fees the lower the number of debit card transactions per capita. However, 
the link between the number of card payments and the level of interchange fee only seems 
evident for a small group of countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden). This 
means that there are other important factors that play a role in the development of card 
payments (availability of cash, availability and convenience of cards, the growth of contactless, 
the importance of other cashless payment methods, and the time period for which the lower 
interchange fees have been in place, etc.). 
NL
IE
HU
DK
BE
FI
LU
SE
FR
LV
MT DEIT
PL
UK
BG
SK
PT
EE
SI
LT AT
RO
GR
CZ ES
HR CY
NL
IE
DK
BE
FISE
MT
IT
PL
UK
BG
EE
y = -9910.4x + 140.19
R² = 0.2423
y = -95505x + 285.42
R² = 0.1306
 -
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
0.00% 0.20% 0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 1.00% 1.20% 1.40% 1.60%
Nu
m
be
r o
f t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 p
er
 ca
pi
ta
Average interchange fee
Pre-IFR (2015) Post-IFR (2017)
THE IMPACT OF EU PRICE RULES: INTERCHANGE FEE REGULATION IN RETAIL PAYMENTS | 11 
 
In the flowing sections two potential explanations for the lack of a clear link between the 
number of card payments and the level of interchange fees are explored. More specifically, 
whether the reduction of the interchange fees is effectively passed on to merchants; whether 
they are steering consumers more towards cards; and whether costs for holding cards have 
changed. 
Box 2. Growing importance of international card schemes 
Since the introduction of the IFR, international four-party card schemes (Visa and Mastercard) have 
increased their market share at the expense of national card schemes. In the past, international 
four-party card schemes were primarily active in cross-border payments, which usually only forms 
a small part of the cards sector. Since the introduction of the IFR, international four-party card 
schemes have gained importance with a larger share of the national card transactions. Their share 
of total card transactions in the EU surged to 67.5% at the end of 2016.25 26 
Four reasons explain the growing importance of international four-party card schemes. First, the 
international four-party card schemes are generally frontrunners in the implementation of new 
payment solutions such as online and contactless payments. Second, some new banks (e.g. Monzo, 
N26) offer internationally accepted cards cross-border. Third, customer preference and legal 
capacity for a single payment card for domestic and international payments contributes to the 
increase in co-badging and cards with internationally active card schemes. Fourth, the reduction of 
interchange fees under the IFR reduced the price gap between the international and domestic 
schemes, which makes it more attractive for merchants to accept those and caused some national 
four-party card schemes to decide to cease their activities.27 
Figure 4. Revenues of international card schemes (EUR million) 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on data published by the ECB, European Commission, NBP, Visa, Mastercard and national card schemes. 
 
25 ECB (2019), “Card payments in Europe – current landscape and future prospects: a Eurosystem perspective”: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pubbydate/2019/html/ecb.cardpaymentsineu_currentlandscapeandfuturepros
pects201904~30d4de2fc4.en.html. 
26 According to figures from RBR London, the combined market share of Visa and Mastercard in Europe (EU28 
excl. LU, MT and CY and including NO, CH, RU, TR, UA and KZ) increased from 85.5% in 2014 to 89% in 2016. 
http://www.paymentscardsandmobile.com/MasterCard-and-visa-continue-to-grow-share-of-the-
europeancards-market 
27 ECB (2019), ibid.  
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The increasing importance of the international four-party card schemes is also reflected in the 
growth of their revenues. The card scheme revenues of Mastercard Europe and Visa Europe 
increased nearly five-fold between 2008 and 2018, from €1.7 billion to €7.5 billion. A large part 
of this increase coincided with the introduction of the IFR. However, for the most part, it seems 
that the IFR impacted the revenues of the international four-party card schemes indirectly. The 
operational margin of the international four-party card schemes has increased from around 
12% in 2007 to 33% in 2013, since then the margin has been quite stable, ranging between 23% 
and 35%.  
Card scheme revenues mainly depend on the number of international transactions, which have 
increased significantly in recent years. Moreover, the revenues of Visa Europe, especially, 
increased considerably. With the acquisition of Visa Europe by Visa Inc, it has become a profit-
maximising organisation, which is reflected in fees that have been aligned with the higher fees 
of Visa Inc.28 However, it is difficult to assess the development of the scheme’s fees as these 
are not made public.29 
  
 
28  Godwin, C. (2017), “Your Merchant Service Charge (MSC) is changing – here’s why:” 
https://cmspi.com/eur/blogs/mscbreakdown/ 
29 FOD Economie (2019), “De werking van de markt van de elektronische betalingen in België – mei 2019”: 
https://economie.fgov.be/nl/publicaties/de-werking-van-de-markt-van-de 
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4. Impact of IFR on Merchant Service Charge 
In theory, the introduction of a cap on interchange fees leads to a potential rebalancing of the 
fees from merchants to cardholders and/or a potential overall reduction of the fees. Indeed, as 
a two-sided market the interchange fee for schemes with a high market share is likely to be 
inflated and the transaction costs are likely to be skewed towards the least price-elastic party 
– the merchant in the case of four-party card schemes.  
In such four-party schemes, the interchange fees are typically passed on to the merchant as 
part of the Merchant Service Charges (MSCs), which is the payment by the merchant to the 
acquirer for the execution of card payments. The MSC typically consists of three components: 
i) interchange fee for the issuer from the acquirer; ii) fees for the card scheme that manages 
the four-party card scheme on which the acquirer operates; and iii) fees for the acquirer. The 
latter covers the operational costs and margin of the acquirer. 30 According to the impact 
assessment of the European Commission, prior to the adoption of the IFR, interchange fees 
accounted for about 70% of the MSC.31 
Figure 5. Key components of the merchant costs 
 
Note: The Merchant Service Charge is subject to negotiation, depends on volume/value of transactions and type of merchant. 
Moreover, additional fees (account and transaction fees, return and risk assessments, foreign exchange fees, etc.) may apply 
depending on the private contract with the acquiring bank.  
Source: Author’s formulation based on ECB (2019).32 
 
30 FOD Economie (2019), ibid.  
31 The impact assessment conducted by the European Commission on the proposal for a regulation on 
interchange fees for card-based payment transactions states on page 122 that MIFs make up approximately 
70% of MSC. See: European Commission (2013), “Commission Staff Working Document – Impact 
Assessment,” SWD(2013) 288 final, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/framework/ 
130724_impact-assessment-fulltext_en.pdf.  
32 ECB (2019), ibid.  
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The reduction of the interchange fees should in principle lead to a reduction of the MSCs. The 
MSCs can take various forms. Most merchants pay an agreed amount per transaction, but there 
are alternative fee structures for merchants. The merchant can be charged additional fees for 
the rental or purchase of payment terminals as well as for the installation and activation of the 
terminal.33 
4.1 Past experiences with interchange fee caps 
Evidence on the regulation of the interchange fees in some jurisdictions shows a differentiated 
impact on MSC.  
In Australia the regulator measured a significant decrease in the MSCs once the regulation of 
interchange fees entered into force in January 2003. The decrease of the MSCs was largely in 
line with the drop in interchange fees. In parallel, they measured some increases in the terminal 
fees and fees related to transactions (paper, charge-backs).34 
In the United States the impact on the MSCs was more mixed. Unlike the Australian reforms, 
the Durbin Amendment in the US only targets the interchange fees charged for debit card 
transactions by financial institutions with more than USD 10 billion (€9 billion) in assets. For 
those institutions, the interchange fee reduced by about half in October 2011. Based on a 
survey among merchants two years after the introduction by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond and Javelin Strategy & Research, the impact on the acceptance costs is limited and 
unequal. More specifically, about two-thirds of the surveyed merchants did not report any or 
know about any change to the debit card transactions. Additionally, about a quarter of the 
merchants even reported an increase in transaction costs, while only the remaining tenth of 
merchants witnessed a decrease in charges. The survey does not provide explanations for the 
mixed impact.35 
In Spain there was a series of regulatory interventions to reduce interchange fees through 
regulatory incremental interventions. In 2002 and between 2005 and 2009, the interchange 
fees were reduced based on agreements between the Spanish government and the national 
card schemes. The imposed interchange fee reductions based on the agreements with the 
government were complemented with decreases initiated by the card schemes. Based on data 
from 45 Spanish issuing and acquiring banks for the period between 1997 and 2007, Valverde 
et al. (2016) find that the reduction of interchange fees had a positive impact on merchant 
acceptance, yet did not lead to a reduction in the number of cards in circulation, despite higher 
cardholder fees. Moreover, the increase in transactions more than offset the loss in revenues 
due to the reduction in interchange fees. In their assessment Valverde et al. did not distinguish 
 
33 FOD Economie (2019), ibid.  
34 Reserve Bank of Australia (2005), Payments System Board Annual Report, 2004. 
35 Wang, Z., Schwartz, S., and Mitchell, N. (2014),”‘The Impact of the Durbin Amendment on Merchants: A Survey 
Study”, Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 
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between interchange fee reductions related to government intervention and industry 
initiatives, which might have affected the findings.36 
4.2 Experiences with IFR: Belgium and Italy  
Turning to the IFR, according to a market consultation conducted by the ECB, the impact on the 
MSCs is mixed.37 The impact of the IFR is also difficult to assess as the banking systems and 
circumstances differ greatly across countries (market concentration, card penetration, 
presence of a national card scheme, alternative e-payments, scale advantages, etc.).  
This section discusses the main findings from studies on the impact of the IFR on MSCs in 
Belgium and Italy. These studies give some information about the impact of the IFR, but more 
information on other EU member states would be required for a fuller understanding of the 
impact of the IFR on MSCs. 
4.2.1 Belgium 
Besides having the international four-party card schemes Visa and Mastercard, Belgium also 
has a domestic card scheme entitled ‘Bancontact’. Belgian banks have already indicated that 
they would prefer to cease Bancontact and replace it with an international four-party card 
scheme, but merchants have rejected this idea for fear it might increase their costs. Hence, the 
interchange fee of Bancontact is set at 0.20% with a maximum of €0.05 per transaction (0.10% 
on average), which corresponds to about half the amount international four-party card 
schemes charge in most other EU member states. Moreover, until 2012 the transactions of 
Bancontact were exclusively processed by Worldline, however as of 2018 there are 16 more 
parties with a licence to process Bancontact payment transactions. 
The Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs has assessed the impact of the IFR based on 
information from three acquirers for 2015 (pre-IFR) and 2019 (post-IFR) .38 The three acquirers 
had different fee structures; blended, interchange++ and payment package. When the acquirer 
charges a blended fee, the merchant pays a fixed transaction cost for a particular card scheme, 
notwithstanding the brand, country of issuance (EEA vs non-EEA), type of card (consumer vs 
commercial) and card acceptance. The interchange++ sets a fixed acquirer fee per transaction 
plus variable interchange and scheme fees that are determined by the card schemes. The 
payment packages require either a periodic subscription fee from the merchant for which it 
can accept a fixed number of card transactions or a fixed subscription plus an additional fee per 
transaction.  
Looking at the price of the acceptance of card payments before and after the introduction of 
the IFR, the MSCs have decreased for most of the merchants and the interchange fees for 
 
36 Carbó Valverde, S., Chakravorti, S., and Rodríguez Fernández, F. (2016),”‘The Role of interchange Fees in Two-
Sided Markets: An Empirical Investigation on Payment Cards”, The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
37 ECB (2019), ibid.  
38 FOD Economie (2019), ibid.  
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Bancontact transactions reduced slightly (from €0.056 to maximum €0.05). The international 
four-party card schemes reduced their interchange fees by about half to maximum €0.056. The 
MSCs decreased for all merchant profiles and nearly all price structures. The granularity of the 
data did not allow us to assess the extent to which the reduction in the interchange fee was 
translated into lower MSCs. The change in MSCs for the different profiles and price structures 
ranged between -48% and +10%. On average, the MSCs decreased by 11% between 2015 and 
2019.  
The assessment was complicated by a lack of detail in the pricing, which did not allow a 
differentiation between the interchange fee, scheme fees and acquirer fees, no standard 
transaction or a change in fee structures. For example, the acquirer offering packages increased 
the price of its packages substantially in 2016, but with the higher charge they also changed 
the packages by including a number of free transactions and a reduction in the charges per 
transaction. Moreover, the acquirer offering interchange++ could not provide the costs for the 
period before the introduction of the IFR, as the costs were only available on request. Regarding 
the latter, the Ministry received a complaint from a merchant that they carry the risk of 
transaction costs as the interchange fees for unregulated international transactions are hard to 
predict. This is one of the reasons that an increasing share of merchants are switching to a 
blended structure, which requires the acquirer to incorporate the risk of the interchange as 
well as scheme fees. 
4.2.2 Italy 
The Bank of Italy also assessed the impact of the IFR on the MSCs charged by about 400 
acquirers (banks and non-banks).39 The interchange fee prior to the introduction of the IFR in 
2015 was estimated to be 0.5% and accounted for the largest share of the MSC fees of around 
0.8%. After the introduction of the IFR the interchange fee dropped about 0.2% to 0.3% on 
average, while the MSC dropped about 0.17% in 2016 and 2017 to 0.63%. This means that the 
reduction of the MSC is broadly in line with the decrease of the interchange fee. Moreover, the 
acceptance of card payments measured in terms of number of transactions per POS terminal 
increased substantially after the introduction of the IFR, from about a 5% increase per year 
between 2013 and 2015 before the introduction of the IFR, to 10% and more in the years just 
after its introduction in 2016 and 2017.  
Looking at the EU-level, the number of transactions per terminal increased slightly after the 
introduction of the IFR, but not more than in the year preceding the introduction (i.e. 6.9% 
increase in 2015 compared to 5.5% in 2016). The number of terminals also increased 
significantly after the introduction of the IFR (i.e. a 6.8% increase in 2015 and 9.4%, 9.5% and 
12.3% in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively). 
 
39 Ardizzi, G. and M. Savini Zangrandi (2018), “The impact of the interchange fee regulation on merchants: 
evidence from Italy”, Bank of Italy Occasional Papers:  https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2018-
0434/QEF_434_18.pdf 
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Importantly, both Belgium and Italy have national card schemes that generally have lower 
scheme fees. It is known that some of the fees charged by international four-party card 
schemes have increased significantly in recent years, which might partially or completely have 
offset the decrease of the interchange fees due to the IFR (see Box 2). 
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5. Impact of IFR on cardholder fees 
Issuers might want to compensate for the lower interchange fees by increasing other fees or 
reducing costs. For example, they might increase the cardholder fees or reduce the rewards 
and other benefits for cardholders. 
The evidence of the regulation of interchange fees in various other jurisdictions before the IFR 
was introduced in the EU showed a clear impact on cardholder fees and benefit schemes.  
In Australia, most of the credit card issuing banks changed their offerings in response to the 
implementation of the regulation of interchange fees in January 2003. The issuers both 
increased the annual and other fees and reduced or capped the rewards that can be earned. 
Moreover, many banks also issued new cards that offset the lower rewards and higher fees 
with lower interest rates.40 
In the US, the impact of the interchange fee regulation implemented in October 2011 was 
broadly similar to that observed in Australia. In the US the larger banks covered by the 
regulations changed the terms of the accounts, increasing the prices for accountholders and 
reducing the number of accounts without monthly subscription fees. The increases in the fees 
for these accounts were large enough to offset the lost revenues from the reduction of the 
interchange fees for debit cards.41 
In Spain, a series of interventions to reduce the interchange fees between 2002 and 2009 also 
led to an increase in fees for cardholders. Interestingly, Valverde et al. (2016) find that despite 
this increase in cardholder fees, the number of issued credit cards is not affected. They give 
two potential reasons for this effect. First, the credit cardholders might be fairly insensitive to 
the increase in annual fees. Second, the credit cardholders are more willing to accept higher 
card fees when the card is more widely accepted.42 
There are currently no systematic statistics available on the evolution of the cardholder fees 
and benefits covering all EU member states around the time the IFR was introduced. Moreover, 
it is unclear to what extent the cardholder fee increases are related to the IFR or due to other 
developments. However, there are various analyses at national level indicating that the fees for 
cardholder payment packages have increased. These analyses often relate the increases to 
other coinciding events such as new digital applications and the low interest rate environment.   
 
40 Reserve Bank of Australia (2004), Payments System Board Annual Report – 2004. 
41 Manuszak, M.D., and K. Wozniak (2017), “The Impact of Price Controls in Two-sided Markets: Evidence 
from US Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-074. Washington: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017074pap.pdf 
42 Carbó Valverde, S., Chakravorti, S., and Rodríguez Fernández, F. (2016), “The Role of interchange Fees in Two-
Sided Markets: An Empirical Investigation on Payment Cards”, The Review of Economics and Statistics. 
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In Belgium the majority of current accounts also increased in price between January 2016 and 
January 2018, except for the electronic current accounts with a credit card in 2016.43 
In Italy the price of current accounts increased substantially after years of decline. More 
specifically, between 2011 and 2015 the average costs of current accounts decreased from just 
over €90 per year to €76.5 per year. In the subsequent years the current account costs 
increased to €86.9 in 2019 (+13.6%).44  
In the Netherlands, the price of a current account increased between 2015 and 2019 for all 
Dutch banks, except for one online bank that kept the fee at the same level.45 
  
 
43 FOD Economie (2019), ibid. 
44 Ardizzi, G. and M. Savini Zangrandi (2018), ibid. 
45 MoneyView (2019), Betalingsverkeer, SpecialItem: https://www.infinance.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SI-
108_Betalen_07-2019-1.pdf 
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Four-party card schemes continue to be important payment instruments and have further 
increased their dominance in recent years. On the one hand, merchants feel the need to accept 
card payments to avoid losing business, on the other hand it is becoming more attractive for 
consumers to use cards for retail payments. The increasing reliance on cards for payments 
enhanced the market power of the middleman, i.e. national and international four-party card 
schemes. This allowed the card schemes to set their interchange fees above the economically 
efficient level. 
In 2015, IFR introduced a cap on the interchange fees for consumer debit and credit cards 
within the EEA. This was complemented by other measures avoiding circumvention and 
enhancing the competitiveness of the cards sector, i.e. rules on co-badging, honour all cards, 
transaction processing, etc. 
Data shows that after the introduction of the IFR, interchange fees in nearly all member states 
have decreased. In most member states the new interchange fees have been set at the 
maximum level as defined in the IFR, which led to a reduction in the interchange fees of up to 
87%. There are at least seven member states with average fees below the maximum defined in 
the regulation. These are primarily those with national card schemes, which in most cases have 
lower interchange fees than the international four-party card schemes. 
The reduction in interchange fees, when applied to all acquirers, in principle leads to a 
reduction in fees for merchants. Based on the limited information available on the impact of 
the IFR on MSCs in two member states, merchant service charges have decreased since the 
introduction of the IFR.  
However, the comparison of MSCs over time is not straightforward as there are several price 
structures that are not easy to compare for merchants. Some of the price structures (i.e. 
interchange++) do not allow the merchant to know the costs related to the transaction (i.e. 
interchange fees depend on several factors including the card schemes, country of issuance, 
type of card, etc.). Additionally, the reduction of interchange fees in other member states may 
have been offset by an increase in the scheme fees of the international four-party card 
schemes. 
Evidence from three EU member states as well as other jurisdictions shows that customers are 
likely to face higher annual costs for their cards and lower benefits because of the interchange 
fee regulations. This might have somewhat offset issuers’ losses from lower interchange fees. 
The currently available public information does not allow us to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the IFR. Nevertheless, there are some preliminary policy recommendations that 
can be drawn. 
First, the continuing assessment of the impact of the IFR is recommended as the currently 
available public information is insufficient to draw firm conclusions about the effect of the 
various elements of the IFR. 
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Second, a potential revision of the IFR should promote more transparency regarding the 
interchange fees charged by national card schemes, scheme fees, and card acceptance fees, to 
allow smaller merchants, in particular, to make better comparisons and switch between 
acquirers. 
Third, a close monitoring of developments in the retail payments sector is recommended. The 
growing importance for the economy and dynamic shifts in the payments sector are likely to 
change both the market structure (e.g. importance of different card schemes and alternatives) 
and practices (co-badging, cross-border acceptance of national schemes, mutual recognition of 
national schemes, surcharging, etc.), which might also change the policy problems.
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